No More Median Line in Taiwan Strait
By Lan Ning-li
China Times, August 5, 2022
From noon on August 4, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began military exercises surrounding Taiwan. The drills are the first cross-theater commands, cross branches of armed forces, rocket and strategic support joint military exercises after major reforms of the PLA. The exercises employ real military personnel with live fires. They target Taiwan and at the same time deliberately warn and aim at the United States and Japan if they intend to intervene in future Taiwan contingencies.
Strategically speaking, using Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as an opportunity, Beijing conducts the “joint military actions” by designating military zones encircling the sea and air areas of Taiwan, so Taiwan’s aircraft and vessels are facing dangers entering or leaving Taiwan during the exercises. Taiwan’s major air routes are included in the exercise zones and Taiwan is surrounded. In 2022, Beijing suddenly proclaimed the territorial water baseline to claim its sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, and began normal cruise of the area. Beijing’s strategy in the prior and present situations is to subdue the enemy without battling and is the wisest stratagem.
Almost all six exercise zones of mainland China’s live-fire exercises are inside Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and half of the exercise zone in northern Taiwan has crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait; this means that the median line no longer exists and Taiwan’s ADIZ is actually abolished. If the mainland’s exercises become normal after this time, then Taiwan’s defense will be more complicated in the future.
The southern zone of PLA’s military exercises will cut off the majority portion of Taiwan’s imports of oil and gas as well as the links of military transfers between Kaohsiung and Penghu, amounting to control Taiwan’s Achilles heel. It also warns and deters the U.S. attempt to use Okinawa and Japan’s southwestern islands as bases for intervention, and denies the U.S-Japan military passageway from the Bashi Channel to Sandiao Cape to Diaoyutai Islands. This deployment indicates that the PLA has studied hard on its strategic goals after the Eastern Theater Command was established, and this is not just for show and Taiwan should be worried.
The exercises in the six zones are merely the beginning of encircling and blockade will be put into use in the future. But Taiwan’s government and people have not realized that blockade will be fatal as if the life lines are cut off. If Taiwan loses gas, oil, and electricity, then what can Taiwan use to resist the enemies? When the sea-surrounding Taiwan designates that 50 percent of its energy source is imported natural gas, can Taiwan’s senior national security officials tell us how can the natural gas pass through layers of blockades to reach Taiwan? Do the officials consider national issues and are concerned about navy’s development of anti-blockade and war fighting capabilities? With the threats from air, the cost of anti-blockade will definitely increase and the casualty and replacement rates of surface vessels will increase dramatically.
No matter how many missiles were launched on August 4, two 055 class destroyers and 053C and 053D class vessels are cruising off Hualien’s coast, with the support of drones. Liaoning Strike Force in the northern area and Shandong Strike Force in the southern area are PLA’s new and elite forces. At this moment, people should ask the U.S. officials and think tank scholars whether the so-called asymmetric countermeasures they advocate can resist PLA forces and against threats from which exercise zones? The United States should not interfere in Taiwan’s defense strategy. Facing the scenarios of PLA exercises, the U.S. strategic vision for intervention should probably be revised!
(The author is a retired vice admiral.)
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20220805003420-262104?chdtv